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a b s t r a c t 
We estimate the job displacement effect on criminal behavior for young adult Norwegian men separated from 
their plant of employment during a mass layoff. Displaced workers experience a 20 percent increase in criminal 
charge rates in the year of displacement, with effects declining thereafter. Effects are particularly large for prop- 
erty crimes, consistent with the idea that displaced workers turn to acquisitive crimes to replace lost earnings. 
However, effects are also sizable for violent and alcohol/drug-related crimes, indicating other mechanisms at 
work. We find strong evidence that displacement increases crime effects through the increased availability of 
















































A lack of employment and job opportunities are often considered
mportant causes of criminal behavior ( Bell et al., 2018 ; Fishback et al.,
010 ). Recent world-wide recessions, with particularly high unemploy-
ent rates among traditionally crime-prone groups like young and low
ducated men, have accentuated the importance of understanding re-
ationships between work and crime ( Hoynes et al., 2012 ; Hauser and
aker, 2008 ). In this paper we use individual level data from Norway
o study how the criminal behavior of employed men is affected by job
isplacement. 
There is a rich economic literature exploring the links between la-
or market conditions and crime. 1 Much of the empirical work draws on
S data sources to estimate the relationship between area (usually state)
nemployment rates and crime, with the general finding that unemploy-
ent has a modest but statistically significant positive effect on property
rime rates, with little or no effect on violent crime rates. 2 These find-
ngs are consistent with traditional economic rational choice theories
f crime, which predict that a reduction in licit earnings opportunities
ncreases the allocation of time toward crime for profit ( Ehrlich, 1973 ;∗ Corresponding author at: Research Department, Statistics Norway, Akersv. 26, 01
E-mail addresses: mari.rege@uis.no (M. Rege), ska@ssb.no (T. Skardhamar), kjetil
1 See for example Mustard (2010) for a review or Bell et al. (2018) for a recent con
2 Most of the early work in this area suffered from endogeneity and attenuation bia
merged ( Mustard, 2010 ). For example, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Lin (2
roblems and endogeneity of state unemployment rates, and they find that a one perc
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ecker, 1968 ). The reliance on aggregate data has limited the ability
f previous studies to investigate the mechanisms through which labor
arket conditions may affect criminal behavior. Moreover, when rely-
ng on area-level variation, typically in unemployment rates across US
tates, it is hard to credibly identify causal effects since a number of
ther factors co-vary with unemployment rates. 
We contribute to the existing literature by using individual-level
rime data to provide individual-level estimates of the effects of job
isplacement on crime under a transparent identification strategy (sim-
lar to the strategy of e.g. Huttunen et al., 2018 or Black et al., 2015 ).
pecifically, we investigate the impact of job separation associated
ith mass layoffs on the displaced workers’ engagement in crime.
orkers suffering involuntary job loss represent an important subset of
ndividuals through which weakening labor markets might affect crime.
ocusing on job separations associated with plant mass layoffs allow us
o investigate the impact of involuntary job loss while circumventing the
ost obvious forms of omitted variable bias: the select firing of specific
orkers based on unobserved attributes. Moreover, we can analyze a
icher set of crime categories than others have, including alcohol/drug
ffenses and serious traffic offenses, and we can date crimes to the.telle@ssb.no (K. Telle), mark.votruba@case.edu (M. Votruba). 
tribution. 
s issues, though some studies utilizing more reliably exogenous variation have 
008) employ instrumental variable (IV) methods to address measurement error 
entage point increase in unemployment raises property crime rates 4-6 percent. 
ber 2019 
ticle under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 






















































































































(  ay-of-week they are committed, allowing us to discuss how displaced
orkers’ variation in time availability on work days versus weekends
ay affect crime. Our analysis draws on Norwegian register data that
nclude a rich array of socioeconomic and demographic variables for
he entire resident population, as well as all criminal charges brought
gainst any resident from 1992 through 2008. Individual employment
pell records allow us to calculate employment counts by plant and
ear, from which we can identify separations and mass layoffs. Our
ain analytic sample consists of 361,385 different men, 18–40 years
ld, who were employed with at least two years of tenure in the base-
ine year. Our difference-in-differences (DID) approach compares the
volution of criminal charge rates in a “treated group ” of male workers
ho were separated from their plant of employment during a period of
ass layoff ( the displaced ), to the evolution in charge rates of similar
orkers employed in plants that did not undergo a mass layoff ( the
omparison group ). Pre-separation employment rates are similar across
he two groups, however pre-separation crimes rates are somewhat
igher in the displaced group, necessitating the DID approach. 3 Our
stimated effects are unbiased under the assumption that the difference
n crime rates observed pre-displacement would have continued in equal
agnitude into the post-displacement period had the displacements not
ccurred. The fact that pre-displacement crime rate differences appear
table throughout the pre-displacement period lends credibility to this
ssumption. 
We find that job displacement leads to a sizable increase in crim-
nal charge rates of about 20 percent in the year of displacement,
ith declining effects in the subsequent years. Job displacement in-
reases crime for all studied crime categories. In a relative sense, es-
imated effects are most pronounced for property crimes. Our esti-
ate indicates that job displacement raises the likelihood of property
rimes by about 60 percent in the year of displacement. The relative
ize of effects appears smaller for other crime categories (violence, al-
ohol/drug, serious traffic violations), but significant effects are esti-
ated throughout, and with similar (though small) level effects across all
ategories. 4 
The effect of displacement on crime presumably operates, at least
n part, through workers’ labor market detachment. Based on ratio-
al choice theories of crime (e.g. Becker, 1968 ), a displaced worker
as incentives to shift the allocation of time toward illicit earnings op-
ortunities (i.e. property crime) since displacement reduces legal earn-
ngs opportunities. Additionally, displacement lessens the opportunity
ost of a worker’s time during the period of unemployment (or under-
mployment), with implications for both property and non-property
rimes ( Ehrlich, 1973 ). Our analysis finds that displacement reduces em-
loyment earnings over the immediate years following displacement by
0–15 percent, and displacement substantially increases the likelihood
f being unemployed or of working less than full-time. As in prior stud-
es, the particularly large increase in property crimes provides support
or rational choice theories emphasizing the role of earning replacement
s a motivation for crime by the displaced. On the other hand, the signif-
cant effects on non-property crimes indicate broader mechanisms are
lso at work, including a potential role for time availability . 
Our analysis sheds further light on the time availability mechanism by
xploiting data we have on the exact date each recorded crime occurred.
xcept for property crimes, we find more dramatic increases in crimes
ommitted on work days (Monday-Friday) than on weekends. This sug-
ests that not having to go to work, associated with a decline in struc-
ured daily routines and a reduced opportunity cost of time, is an impor-3 Substantial effort was exerted in attempting to construct more finely- 
atched samples of displaced and comparison group workers, so that estimates 
ould be based on samples with (near) identical pre-displacement crime rates. 
hese efforts were unsuccessful, but those samples consistently produced DID 
stimates similar to those reported here. 









c  ant channel through which displacement affects non-property crimes.
he effects we observe for violent crimes and drug/alcohol-related of-
enses are also in line with theories that highlight the importance of
elf-control, financial concerns, frustration and mental distress in de-
ermining criminal and counterproductive behavior ( Mani et al., 2013 ;
gnew, 1992 ; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990 ). 
These findings make novel contributions to the existing empirical lit-
rature on job loss and crime. We find credible evidence that displace-
ent increases violent (as well as property) crime rates, a fact that has
nly weak support from most of the area-level studies. We find credible
vidence that displacement also affects crimes like traffic offences and
rugs/alcohol-offences, an area where no other credible evidence cur-
ently exists. The large effects on alcohol/drug crimes may be particu-
arly noteworthy in the economics literature, since they are not straight-
orwardly explained by the rational crime theory and thus likely speak
o psychological effects of job displacement. Our day-of-week analysis
s also novel to the literature and provides empirical support for the
mportance of time availability. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 dis-
usses theoretical mechanisms through which plant closure could af-
ect criminal behavior, and relates them to the Norwegian context.
ection 3 presents the empirical strategy, and Section 4 describes the
ata. Section 5 presents our results, including robustness checks, and
ection 6 explores mechanisms. Section 7 concludes. 
. Mechanisms and the Norwegian context 
In the seminal rational crime model of Becker (1968) , individuals
ommit crime when the expected utility from doing so exceeds the ex-
ected utility of not doing so. While Becker (1968) was primarily in-
erested in optimal law enforcement, a number of economic studies
ave extended his model of criminal behavior (see, e.g., overview in
evitt and Miles, 2007 ). Of particular relevance are the extensions of
hrlich (1973) , who introduces a time constraint whereby individuals
ivide their time between licit and illicit activities. 
Insights from the models of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) suggest
wo complementary mechanisms through which involuntary job loss can
ncrease criminal behavior. To the extent job displacement reduces fu-
ure earnings and employment ( Huttunen et al., 2011 ; Rege et al., 2009 ;
tevens, 1997 ; Jacobson et al., 1993 ), we would expect displaced work-
rs to experience an increase in the marginal utility associated with il-
icit earnings (the earnings replacement mechanism) and a decrease in the
pportunity cost of spending time in such activities (the time availabil-
ty mechanism). These mechanisms would anticipate a higher likelihood
or acquisitive crime as a result of displacement. 
These rational choice-based models provide somewhat weaker pre-
ictions for non-acquisitive crime, which fail to compensate for the re-
uction in licit earnings. Nonetheless, non-acquisitive crimes may still
e affected by the reduction in the time costs. Criminologists frequently
ite time availability as an important determinant of criminal behavior.
elson (1998) , for instance, argues that individuals motivated to com-
it crime cannot do so unless an opportunity is present. Less structured
aily routines and increased idleness provide greater opportunities and
ower time-costs for criminal activity. Increased idleness may also in-
rease one’s exposure to criminogenic settings, where alcohol and drugs
ay be present and social norms against deviant behavior are weaker
 Hirschi, 1969 ). These theories (including Ehrlich, 1973 ) suggest the
rime effects of displacement could extend to non-acquisitive crimes,
nd would predict those effects to be largest on days a displaced worker
ould otherwise have been working. Thus, we would anticipate larger
ffects on work day crimes than on weekend crimes. 
In their widely cited “general theory of crime ”, the criminologists
ottfredson and Hirschi (1990) argue that the association between un-
mployment and crime can be explained by variation in individuals’
apacity for self-control, which affects individuals’ ability to succeed in











































































































7 As described below, the workers in both samples are males with at least 
two years of tenure in their firm of employment at the beginning of a particular 
baseline year (as well as meeting other inclusion criteria). The samples are, 
unfortunately, not similar in the pre-displacement crime rates, necessitating the chool and work. 5 The resource model of self-control posits that the ca-
acity for self-control is limited and can be depleted by cognitive and
motional strains, and this model has found support in the experimental
sychology literature (e.g. Inzlicht and Scheichel, 2012 ; Inzlicht et al.,
006 ; Baumeister et al., 1994 ). Empirical findings also suggest that
ob loss imposes strains and mental distress on affected workers (e.g.
arcus, 2013 ; Eliason and Storrie, 2009 ; Dragano et al., 2005 ; McKee-
yan et al., 2005 ; Vahtera and Kivimaki, 1997 ). If so, the resulting di-
inishment of self-control could result in counterproductive behaviors
 Mani et al., 2013 ). Therefore, mental distress/self-control represents a
hird mechanism through which we might anticipate a displacement
ffect on crime, with particular relevance perhaps to non-acquisitive of-
enses like violence and alcohol/drugs. 
The Norwegian context may affect the relevance of each of these
heoretical mechanisms. In Norway, strict rules protect employees from
eing dismissed ( Addison and Teixeira 2003 ), and job displacement is
arely sudden as workers are typically required to receive at least 3
onths of advance notice before being dismissed. Moreover, in the re-
ent decades, Norway has been characterized by low unemployment
ates, even by Scandinavian standards. In 2007, the survey-based un-
mployment rate was 2.5 percent, compared with 4.6 percent for the
S and 7.1 percent for the European Union ( OECD, 2009 ). With strong
emand for workers, the effects of job displacement may not result in
rolonged spells of unemployment, or a deterioration of next-job qual-
ty, which suggests that we might expect more detrimental effects of
isplacement on crime in countries with higher unemployment levels. 
Moreover, public welfare programs in Norway are generous by in-
ernational standards. Virtually all Norwegian workers are covered by
he state’s mandatory unemployment insurance program. The size of the
nemployment benefits is typically around two-thirds of the earnings in
he previous calendar year, and until 2003 a typical receiver was eligi-
le for unemployment benefits for up to three years (thereafter up to
 years). Persons not finding a new job when the unemployment bene-
ts run out can get benefits of the same magnitude by participating in
edical or vocational training programs or by qualifying for disability
ension. The generous welfare benefits available may reduce the incen-
ives to engage in crime for profit compared with other countries where
he individual economic consequences of job loss are more severe. 
On the other hand, enforcement policies are less punitive in Norway
han in the US and the UK ( Christie, 2000 ), which could lessen incen-
ives to avoid crime. Prison terms are substantially shorter for some
ypes of crime in Norway than in countries like US or UK, with re-
arkable differences in incarceration rates. The US incarceration rate
s about 751 per 100,000 inhabitants ( BJS, 2009 ), while the UK rate is
bout 140 ( European Sourcebook, 2006 ), and Norway’s rate is about 91
 Statistics Norway, 2008 ). 
However, for offenses other than murder and robbery, 6 Norwegian
onviction rates are similar to those of many other OECD countries.
or example, the theft rate per 100,000 is 2860 for Norway, 2182 for
he US and 3379 for the UK ( UN, 2008 ). The International Crime Vic-
im Surveys, which might be considered the more reliable data source5 In a meta-analysis Pratt and Cullen (2000) find consistent associations be- 
ween individuals’ criminal behavior and measured levels of self-control. An 
mportant methodological concern in estimating effects of job displacement on 
rime is to rule out spurious associations that might arise from unobserved varia- 
ion in e.g. capacities for self-control (see Sections 3 and 5.1 ). Crime, arrests and 
ncarceration might also have causal effects on future employment opportuni- 
ies, for example, if stigma from a criminal record or human capital depreciation 
rom incarceration, restricts future access to meaningful jobs ( Grogger, 1995 ; 
ager, 2003 ; Mocan and Rees, 2005 ; Kling, 2006 ). 
6 As in the other Scandinavian countries, Norway has among the lowest homi- 
ide rates in the Western world. Norway has a murder rate of 0.71 per 100,000 
nhabitants, compared with rates of 5.62 in the US and 1.41 in England and 
ales. The robbery rate per 100,000 inhabitants is 27.9 in Norway, 147.7 in 
















or cross-national comparisons of crime prevalence, also indicates that
rime rates in Norway are similar to those of other OECD countries. Of
he 30 countries included in the study, Norway is rated with a medium
ictimization rate, with lower rates than Ireland (highest rate), England
nd Wales (next highest) and the US, but higher rates than e.g. France,
ermany and Italy ( van Dijk et al., 2008 ). The crime and justice envi-
onment in Norway may thus be more similar to other counties in the
estern world than suggested by the incarceration and homicide rates.
In summary, over the last decades Norwegian residents have been
acing low unemployment rates, generous public benefits, low homi-
ide and robbery rates and a tradition of less punitive law enforcement
olicies ( Pratt, 2008 ; Christie, 2000 ). The extent that displaced work-
rs are motivated to replace licit with illicit earnings could thus have
een smaller in Norway than in many other Western countries, which
ay suggest a smaller effect of displacement on crime (especially prop-
rty crime) in Norway than elsewhere. However, it cannot be ruled out
hat such a moderating influence of welfare benefits is counteracted by
ower expected punishment in Norway compared with many other West-
rn countries. This contextual background should be kept in mind when
nterpreting the results. 
. Empirical strategy 
We estimate the effect of job displacement on crime using a
ifference-in-differences (DID) approach, which compares the evolution
n crime rates in a sample of displaced workers to those in a sample of
imilar 7 non-displaced workers (our comparison group). 
Workers are (potentially) included in the displacement sample if,
n a given year, the workers separate from their plant of employment
uring a period when the plant is undergoing a mass layoff. For such
orkers, the year of separation is considered the workers’ baseline year ,
nd we deem the separation to be associated with mass layoff if the
orker’s plant experienced a reduction in plant employment exceeding
0 percent, either in the baseline year or in either of the two adjacent
ears. 8 This method for identifying displaced workers largely resem-
les definitions that have previously been applied in the literature (e.g.
uttunen et al., 2018 ; Black et al., 2015 ; Davis and von Wachter, 2011 ;
ouch and Placzek, 2010 ; Jacobsen et al., 1993 ). 9 In an attempt to ex-
lude temporary or mis-recorded separations, such as cases of workers
elocating within the same firm, we also required evidence that the sep-
ration was permanent. To operationalize this, we omit workers from
he displaced sample if they had returned to their baseline firm of em-
loyment by the end of the second post-displacement calendar year. 
In contrast, workers are (potentially) included in the comparison
roup, for that same baseline year, if their plant-of-employment atID approach taken in this paper. 
8 Employment counts are based on full-time equivalents (FTEs) measured at 
he end of each calendar year. Mass downsizing events in our data are often 
arked by several consecutive years of high separation rates, which is why we 
ssociate separations with mass downsizing even when the major period of em- 
loyment reduction was a year removed from the year separation occurs. 
9 There are also some smaller differences between our approach and that of 
e.g.) Jacobsen et al. (1993) or Couch and Placzek (2010) . First, they define 
ass layoff as a 30 percent decrease relative to the maximum employment level 
f the plant in the last (6) years before the baseline year, while we define it as a 
ecline of 30 percent relative to the preceding year. Second, while they restrict 
he sample to plants with at least 50 employees, we restrict our main sample 
o plants with more than 10 full-time-equivalents, and while they require job 
enure of at least 6 years for inclusion, we require only 2 years. Lastly, because 
f data availability, they exclude workers who do not receive positive earnings 
n all the years of their data window, while we can follow every worker through 
ime regardless of earnings. 












































































































b  he start of that year did not undergo a mass downsizing 10 and the
orker remained employed in that plant through the end of that year.
gain, this definition of comparison group is similar to definitions that
ave previously been applied in the literature (e.g. Huttunen et al.,
018 ; Black et al., 2015 ; Davis and von Wachter, 2011 ; Couch and
laczek, 2010 ; Jacobsen et al., 1993 ), where the comparison group is
ften defined to comprise workers who are never separated from their
lant of employment. The definitions of the displaced and comparison
roup imply that workers who remained employed in plants that under-
ent a mass layoff are excluded from the sample, as are workers who
eparate from non-downsizing plants. 
To demonstrate our empirical model, consider the sample of dis-
laced and comparison workers constructed for baseline year ( b ) 1997.
or these workers, we can observe crimes over calendar years ( t ) 1992–
008 or, equivalently, over relative years 𝜏= − 5 to 𝜏= 9 (where 𝜏= t-b).
ollowing the literature, we employ various specifications of a dis-
ributed lag model, here illustrated by a linear probability model (we
ill also apply logit models): 
r 
(
𝑐 𝑖𝜏 = 1 
)






+ 𝜀 𝑖𝜏 (1)
here 
c i 𝜏 indicator that worker i commits at least one crime in relative year
𝜏 (with 𝜏 = − 5, − 4,..,9 for baseline year 1997) 
𝑥 
𝑖 
vector of control variables measured at the beginning of the base-
line year (see Appendix B for details) 
𝛾𝜏 vector of fixed effects associated with each relative year 
𝑑 𝑘 
𝑖 
dummy variables set to one for displaced workers in the k th relative
year, otherwise zero (with k = − 5, − 4..,9 for baseline year 1997) 
𝜀 i 𝜏 error term with expectation zero. 
The main parameters of interest are the 𝛿k coefficients which cap-
ure the difference in the likelihood of crime between workers in the
isplacement and comparison group in each relative year, from 5 years
receding the displacement (of the displaced workers) to 9 years after. If
isplacement increases crime, we would expect 𝛿0 to be higher than the
k in pre-displacement years, i.e. 𝛿− 5 to 𝛿− 2 . Estimates of 𝛿k pertaining
o subsequent post-displacement years ( 𝛿1 , 𝛿2 , .. ) allow us to explore
he extent that the crime response to displacement fades (or possibly
ncreases) over time. 
Notably, we do not regard estimates of 𝛿− 1 as (strictly) pertaining to
he “pre-displacement period ” for two main reasons. First, as mentioned
arlier, Norwegian workers are notified in advance of an impending dis-
lacement, and they may in many instances foresee and prepare for their
lant failing well before layoff ( Basten et al., 2016 ). To the extent knowl-
dge of an impending layoff operates on criminal behavior, as it might
nder either the earnings replacement or mental distress/self-control mech-
nisms, estimates of 𝛿− 1 would capture those effects. Furthermore, it is
nown that separation dates are not recorded with 100 percent accu-
acy, with ample evidence that separations sometimes occurred earlier
han what is recorded in employment registries. 11 This would also con-
ribute to us estimating a displacement effect that appears to pre-date
he displacement event. 
To produce specific estimates of the displacement effect, we rely on a
tandard DID assumption: that any difference in pre-displacement crime
ates would have persisted if not for the displacements the displaced
orkers experienced. Econometrically, this assumption is implemented10 Either in the baseline year, or the adjacent-to-baseline years. 
11 For instance, a fair number of disability program entrants appear to still be 
mployed fulltime (in their prior plant) for a few months after disability entry. 
or this reason, we always exclude from our sample of “workers ” persons on 






y modifying our model as follows: 
r 
(
𝑐 𝑖𝜏 = 1 
)






+ 𝜀 𝑖𝜏 (2)
here 𝑑 
𝑖 
is the fixed effect associated with being in the displaced group,
nd the time-varying effects of displacement are only modeled for rel-
tive years − 1 going forward. Under the DID assumption, the 𝛿k coef-
cients provide causal estimates of the crime effect of displacement in
ach year relative to the pre-displacement years ( − 5 through − 2). 
The fact that we have panel data allows us to define displacement
nd comparison groups for multiple baseline years. To maximize power,
e therefore stack the data for each of the baseline years, and run re-
ressions on the pooled data (see Huttunen et al., 2018 or Black et al.,
015 for a similar procedure). Baseline year, relative year and calen-
ar year are thus defined for all workers in both the comparison and
he treatment group, which introduces a few additional considerations.
irst, it is possible for some workers to be displaced in multiple baseline
ears. To simplify matters, we only consider the first baseline year in
hich such a worker is displaced. Second, it is possible for a worker to
e displaced in one baseline year and belong to the comparison group in
nother baseline year. To avoid “partly-treated ” workers in the compar-
son group, we do not allow a worker who is in the displacement group
o be in the comparison group of any baseline year. Third, to general-
ze the model to the pooled data, and to account for common calendar
ear shocks, we include indicators to capture the calendar year effects. 12 
inally, in all regressions we cluster on the individual worker, but we
lso explore how the estimated standard errors are affected by restrict-
ng workers in the comparison group to be present in no more than one
aseline year. 
Our estimation strategy is a straightforward generalization of the
difference-in-differences ” method, and it thus relies on the comparison
roup to account for changes in crime rates over time that would have
ccurred in the absence of displacement. The crucial assumption for a
onsistent estimate of the displacement effect is that the crime rates in
he displacement and comparison groups would have evolved similarly
ver time in the absence of the displacement. This assumption can be
ested, to some degree, by comparing the evolution of crime rates in the
wo groups during the pre-displacement period. 
It might be worth drawing attention to a couple of distinctions with
espect to what conceptual effects this approach does not attempt to
stimate. First, it does not estimate the effect of exposure to mass layoff
n crime. As long as the plant does not close completely, a number of
orkers are retained in the plant during and after the mass layoff. There
re several studies that look at the average effect (on various outcomes)
f exposure to plant downsizing over both laid off and retained workers,
nd some have argued that this average is more policy relevant than the
ffects specific to laid off workers (e.g. Rege et al., 2011 , 2009). Indeed,
ome studies indicate that adverse effects on the retained workers could
e as severe, or even more severe, than the adverse effects on the laid
ff workers ( Vahtera and Kivimaki, 1997 ). However, what we attempt
o estimate in the current study is the effect on the displaced workers
nly, neglecting possible effects on the workers who remain in the plant
hrough and after the mass layoff. 
Second, it does not estimate the effect of unemployment on crime. A
umber of the workers separated from their plant during a mass layoff
ould be directly entering a new job in another plant. Indeed, some of
hese workers may not even leave involuntarily, but may have got a
etter offer elsewhere around the time their plant downsized. What we
stimate is therefore the overall effect of job separation in association
ith a mass layoff over all separating workers, including those who go
irectly into another job, those who undergo a period of unemployment,12 We could have alternatively included fixed effects for baseline year with 
dentical results, as baseline year, relative year and calendar year are perfectly 
ollinear. 




































































































t  nd those who drop out of the workforce altogether. As discussed in
ection 2 , the mechanisms through which displacement increases crime
re presumably stronger for those undergoing a period of involuntarily
nemployment following the displacement. 13 
. Data 
.1. Data sources 
To estimate the effect of job displacement on crime, we combine two
egister databases provided by Statistics Norway. The databases can be
erged using a unique personal identifier provided to every Norwegian
esident at birth or immigration. The first database contains complete
ecords of criminal charges for every Norwegian resident over the pe-
iod 1992–2009. We utilize offenses committed through 2008 to allow
or a registration lag between the time an offense is committed and
he charges. The database contains all serious crimes, but also misde-
eanors like drunk driving, excessive speeding and shop lifting. A per-
on is registered as “charged ” if the police perform an investigation and
onclude that the person did commit the recorded crime, and the case
s considered solved. The investigation may be initiated by the police
eceiving a report or by an arrest. The registration is independent of the
urther outcome of the case (filing of formal charges, prosecutions or
onvictions). 14 Date of crime and detailed codes of “offense type ” are
lso included on charge records. Statistics Norway has constructed sub-
ategories of crime and we rely on these definitions to construct crime
ategories that correspond to those used by the US FBI (see Appendix
). 
The second database is called FD-trygd . It is a rich longitudinal
atabase with records for every Norwegian resident from 1992 to 2008
for most variables), containing individual demographic information
e.g. sex, age, marital status), socio-economic data (e.g. education, in-
ome), current employment status, industry of employment, indicators
f participation in Norway’s welfare programs, and geographic identi-
ers of area of residence. 
In particular, FD-trygd contains records for timing of employment
events ” since 1995. These events, captured by individual and date, in-
lude entries into and exits out of employment, changes in employment
tatus (full time, part time, minor part time), and changes in plant and
rm of employment. The employment records are constructed by data
nalysts at Statistics Norway from raw employment spell records sub-
itted by employers, and verified against employee wage records to
nsure the validity of each spell and to eliminate records pertaining to
secondary ” employment spells. 15 13 It is tempting to imagine the causal effect of unemployment could be investi- 
ated by using mass downsizing events as an instrument. To our mind, this exer- 
ise makes no sense unless we imagine unemployment to be the sole mechanism 
hrough which downsizing affects criminal behavior. The results we present in- 
icate this isn’t true. 
14 A problem that should be kept in mind when measuring results from any 
mpirical study of crime is the difficulty in measuring latent criminal activity. 
elf-reports of criminal activity should be interpreted cautiously since they are 
ften impossible to validate and since the extent of truthful self-reporting is 
ower among subjects with an extensive criminal record than among subjects 
ith little or no criminal history ( Kirk, 2006 ; MacDonald, 2002 ; Farrington et al., 
003 ; Hinderlang et al., 1981 ). Crime data from registries have the advantage 
hat offenders cannot choose not to be registered. The main disadvantage of 
egister data is that crimes which are not reported to the police are not recorded, 
nd crimes left “unsolved ” cannot be matched to a specific individual. 
15 If an individual was employed in multiple plants at a given time, primary 
mployment was determined by employment status and recorded income from 
ach source of employment. A plant’s identifier is only supposed to change if at 
east two of the three following conditions are met at the same time: geograph- 
cal relocation, change of industry and new owner. In reality, and especially 
ithin firms, plant identifiers may change even if a large proportion of the same 




















Based on the employment records, we constructed plant-level em-
loyment counts at the end of years 1995 to 2008. The counts were
onstructed as measures of full-time equivalents (FTEs), with part time
nd minor part time employment measured as 0.67 and 0.33 FTEs, re-
pectively. Excluded from these counts were any person identified in
D-trygd as self-employed or receiving assistance that should have pre-
luded full time work (rehabilitation pensions, disability pensions, etc.).
he annual plant FTE were then used to identify separations that were
ssociated with a mass downsizing as described in Section 3 . 
.2. Defining analytic sample 
Our main analytic sample consists of men between 18 and 40 years of
ge at the beginning of the baseline year. We restrict to non-elderly men
ecause crime rates among women and older men are too low to provide
stimates with any precision ( Statistics Norway, 2008 ; Freeman, 1996 ;
irschi and Gottfredson, 1983 ). Moreover, to study effects on crime of
ob displacement, men in our sample were required to have had rea-
onable attachment to an established job. Specifically, we restrict the
ain analytic sample to men who were full-time employed preceding
he baseline year, excluding a few cases where the man received as-
istance that should have precluded full time work, such as disability
enefits. We also require the men to have at least two years of tenure in
he plant at the beginning of the baseline year, to ensure durable attach-
ent to one’s current plant of employment. As a precaution against the
lant downsizing variable being correlated with unobserved individual
eterminants of crime, we exclude men working in a plant with less than
0 FTEs at the beginning of the baseline year. 
We construct our main analytic sample by appending the 10 base-
ine year datasets (1997–2006) together, yielding a panel dataset with
0,526,937 person-year observations. The dataset consists of 361,385
ifferent men in the ten baseline years, with 83,974 different men in
he displacement group and 277,411 different men in the comparison
roup. As mentioned, the displaced men are present in one baseline year
nly, while more than 90 percent of the men in the comparison group
ppear in several baseline years. 16 For all men we can observe crimes
ver the 17 years 1992–2008, but to avoid that the panel becomes highly
nbalanced for the early (1997) and late (2006) baseline years, we only
se crime data for the 11 relative years − 5 to 5. 17 
.3. Summary statistics 
Variables capturing individual and plant socio-economic characteris-
ics were constructed based on FD-trygd records pertaining to the begin-
ing of the baseline year. A number of these variables ( x ) are included as
ovariates in our estimation models (see Appendix B for details). Sum-
ary statistics are presented in Table 1 for our main analytic sample
n the baseline year. About 8 percent 18 of the sample was displaced.
he average age in the sample is about 34 years, and 38 percent ofenuate our results somewhat, the most typical cases of restructuring should be 
aptured by utilizing firm identifiers in defining permanent displacement (see 
ection 3 ). 
16 On average, a worker in the comparison group is present in 3.4 baseline 
ears. As mentioned, we will always cluster on the individual worker, and we 
lso explore how the estimated standard errors are affected if we allow workers 
n the comparison group to be included in only one baseline year. 
17 This ensures that the panel is fully balanced in the five years prior to the 
aseline year (1997-5 = 1992) and up to relative year + 2 (2006 + 2 = 2008), while 
or relative year + 3 and after it becomes unbalanced (since we do not have crime 
ata after 2008). 
18 As mentioned, workers in the comparison group are present in 3.4 baseline 
ears on average. This implies that the rate of unique men in our main analytic 
ample who were displaced is much larger than 8 percent, it is 24 percent. Re- 
all that all the men who were not separated from a plant in association with a 
ass layoff (or who e.g. worked in plants with less than 10 FTE, cf. the exclu- 
ion restrictions described above) are excluded from our main analytic sample, 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics. 
Variable All Displaced group Comparison group Difference 
Displaced 0.08 
Age 33.8 33.3 33.9 − 0.54 ∗ ∗ 
(4.7) (4.9) (4.7) 
Compulsory school only 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.01 ∗ ∗ 
High school only 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.00 
More than high school 0.28 0.27 0.28 − 0.01 ∗ ∗ 
Educ. Missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 − 0.00 
Earnings 354,600 354,500 354,600 0.81 
(184,200) (197,200) (183,000) 
Tenure 5.6 4.7 5.6 − 0.99 ∗ ∗ 
(3.1) (2.9) (3.1) 
Married 0.39 0.37 0.39 − 0.02 ∗ ∗ 
Children (below 18) 0.55 0.52 0.55 − 0.03 ∗ ∗ 
FTE of plant 298.0 224.3 304.8 − 80.5 ∗ ∗ 
(721.8) (475.8) (739.6) 
Crime in baseline year 0.019 0.028 0.018 0.009 ∗ ∗ 
# observations 1,019,940 83,974 935,966 
Notes: Variables are measured at the beginning of the baseline year (operationalized as the 
end of the relative year − 1) unless otherwise specified. Standard deviations in parentheses. ∗ 
and ∗ ∗ indicate that the variable is significantly different across the group of displaced and 
comparison workers at the 5 and 1 percent level (two-sided t -test). 
Fig. 1. Proportion full-time employed around the baseline 























g  he men in the sample were married. The displaced and the compar-
son group differ on observables, but in general the magnitude of the
ifferences is quite small. The displaced are about half a year younger
han the men in the comparison group, and are somewhat less educated,
ut their (pre-displacement) earnings are similar. We also see that they
ad somewhat shorter tenure and that they worked in smaller plants.
ig. 1 shows the development over time in the rate of full-time employ-
ent for the two groups. By construction of the dataset, everyone is
equired to be full-time employed at the start of the baseline year, and
s expected, we see that full-time employment drops substantially for
he displaced in the baseline year; before it starts to converge to the
omparison group. Overall, the displacement and comparison groups
re fairly similar, but Table 1 shows some deviations which indicate themplying that fewer than 24 percent of all employed men in Norway experienced 






i  eed to consider robustness to controlling for pre-existing differences
cross the two groups. 
. Empirical findings 
.1. Main results 
The two thick lines in Fig. 2 show the evolution of crime rates,
elative to the baseline year, for the displaced (solid) and the com-
arison (dashed) group. We see that the crime rate of the displaced is
enerally above that of the comparison group, but the trend in crime
or the comparison group is similar to the trend for the displaced during
he pre-displacement period. This is illustrated with the thin dashed
ine, which is calculated by adding the mean pre-displacement ( 𝜏< − 1)
ifference in crime rates to the crime rate of the comparison group in
very year. It is evident that the relative crime rate of the displaced
ncreases around the time of displacement, while there is no similar
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Fig. 2. Proportion charged of crime around the baseline 

































































20 In the subsequent tables we will restrict attention to the estimates for − 1 
to + 2. We do this for three reasons. First, point estimates that might have been 
somewhat different or not significant in the individual fixed effects model are 
not reported. Second, point estimates that might be biased due to unbalanced 
panel (the panel becomes unbalanced from + 3; see footnote 17) are not reported. 
Third, it succinctly conveys the point estimates of main interest. 
21 Negative binomial models took an excessively long time to converge, and ncrease for the comparison group around the baseline year. This is
hat we would expect if job displacement results in more crime. 
Table 2 presents regression results. Model 1 shows OLS regression
esults for Eq. (1) with no control variables, which simply provides the
ifferences in crime rates between the displaced and comparison groups,
.e. the difference between the two thick lines in Fig. 2 . We see that the
ifference in the crime rate fluctuates around 0.6–0.7 percentage points
ver years 𝜏= − 5 to 𝜏= − 2. Then the difference rises to 0.9 percentage
oints in the baseline year ( 𝜏= 0), before declining in subsequent years.
ontrolling for age and calendar year fixed effects in Model 2 reduces
ach of the point estimates somewhat, but the differential change from
he pre-displacement to post-displacement years is slightly larger. 
Model 1 and 2 and Fig. 2 show that the displaced have a higher crime
ate than the comparison group over the years preceding the displace-
ent, indicating that the displaced are more crime-prone irrespective
f any exposure to job displacement. 19 As discussed in Section 3 , this
s not a concern for our difference-in-differences identification strategy
s long as the crime rate in the displaced group would have evolved
imilarly over time (in the absence of displacement) as it does for the
omparison group. In this respect, it is reassuring that the trend in crime
ates is similar for the displacement and comparison groups in the years
receding displacement. 
To obtain a difference-in-differences estimator, we include in Model
 a dummy variable identifying displaced workers and omit the displace-
ent terms pertaining to the pre-displacement period, as in Eq. (2) . In
oing so, we effectively “difference out ” the mean pre-displacement dif-
erence in crime rates observed across the two groups. Our estimates
n Model 3 therefore capture the effect of displacement under the as-
umption that pre-existing differences in crime rates across the two
roups would have remained unchanged (conditional on the included
ovariates) in the absence of displacement. Our estimates indicate a
re-displacement difference in crimes rates of 0.44 percentage points
etween the displaced and comparison group (conditional on age and
alendar year dummies). The estimated effect of displacement on crime
ates in the baseline year is 0.38 percentage points. This effect estimate19 There could be selection at the plant level, for example if plants with os- 
illating employment stocks are only able to attract more crime-prone workers. 
here could also be selection at the individual level, for example if firms are lay- 
ng off more crime-prone men first in association with mass layoffs. We return 







s hardly affected by adding a rich array of control variables (Model 4)
r individual fixed effects (Model 5), but we note that the individual
xed effects model reveals a more clear-cut decline in the effect of dis-
lacement on crime in the years after displacement, and no statistically
ignificant effect remains after 4 years. 20 
The dependent variable is dichotomous with a mean close to zero,
hich suggest that the logit model is, for example, more efficient than
LS. Models 6–8 present estimated odds ratios from logit models that
orrespond to the OLS Models 2–4. 21 From the implied marginal ef-
ects (reported in square brackets) we see that the logit and the OLS
odels produce similar estimates, and, more importantly, that the time
attern of the logit estimates also indicate a positive effect of job dis-
lacement on crime. The results in Model 4 (OLS) and in Model 8 (Logit)
ndicate that job displacement increases the probability of committing
rime by about 20 percent in the baseline year, 22 with estimated effects
hat weaken in subsequent years. In the following, we will use Model 8
s our model of reference. 
.2. Robustness of main results 
Table 3 presents several robustness checks. First, the results pre-
ented in Model 1 are from the exact same model as the one presented
n Model 8 of Table 2 , but now we only report the estimated coefficients
or relative years − 1 to + 2 and the dummy indicating that the worker
s in the displacement group. 
One concern with our reference model is that the same man can be
resent in the comparison group in several baseline years. While thisften failed to converge altogether. For models that did converge, like the one 
orresponding to Model 7 of Table 2 , results were qualitatively the same as those 
eported. 
22 Dividing the marginal effect estimate (0.38 percentage points) from Model 4 
y the baseline crime rate (1.96 percent) yields a relative effect of 19.4 percent. 
he mean marginal effect implied from the logit estimate of Model 8 (provided 
n square brackets) produces a nearly identical relative effect estimate. 
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Table 2 
Main results: effect on crime of being displaced in relative year 0 (baseline year). 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Dependent variable: Any crime in the given relative year 
Displaced (dummy) 0.0044 ∗ ∗ 0.0038 ∗ ∗ 1.1933 ∗ ∗ 1.1713 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0163) (0.0160) 
[0.0035] [0.0031] 
Estimate of effect of 
displacement in given 
relative year 
− 5 0.0061 ∗ ∗ 0.0038 ∗ ∗ 1.1522 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0244) 
[0.0028] 
− 4 0.0062 ∗ ∗ 0.0041 ∗ ∗ 1.1765 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0258) 
[0.0031] 
− 3 0.0073 ∗ ∗ 0.0054 ∗ ∗ 1.2446 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0279) 
[0.0043] 
− 2 0.0060 ∗ ∗ 0.0043 ∗ ∗ 1.2108 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0284) 
[0.0038] 
− 1 0.0077 ∗ ∗ 0.0064 ∗ ∗ 0.0020 ∗ ∗ 0.0019 ∗ ∗ 0.0017 ∗ ∗ 1.3265 ∗ ∗ 1.1115 ∗ ∗ 1.1085 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0308) (0.0263) (0.0264) 
[0.0055] [0.0021] [0.0020] 
0 0.0093 ∗ ∗ 0.0082 ∗ ∗ 0.0038 ∗ ∗ 0.0038 ∗ ∗ 0.0035 ∗ ∗ 1.4367 ∗ ∗ 1.2039 ∗ ∗ 1.1987 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0329) (0.0285) (0.0286) 
[0.0071] [0.0036] [0.0035] 
1 0.0089 ∗ ∗ 0.0080 ∗ ∗ 0.0036 ∗ ∗ 0.0035 ∗ ∗ 0.0032 ∗ ∗ 1.4319 ∗ ∗ 1.1999 ∗ ∗ 1.1912 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0332) (0.0293) (0.0293) 
[0.0070] [0.0036] [0.0034] 
2 0.0079 ∗ ∗ 0.0071 ∗ ∗ 0.0026 ∗ ∗ 0.0026 ∗ ∗ 0.0022 ∗ ∗ 1.3902 ∗ ∗ 1.1650 ∗ ∗ 1.1537 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0331) (0.0293) (0.0292) 
[0.0065] [0.0030] [0.0028] 
3 0.0072 ∗ ∗ 0.0065 ∗ ∗ 0.0020 ∗ ∗ 0.0020 ∗ ∗ 0.0015 ∗ 1.3635 ∗ ∗ 1.1426 ∗ ∗ 1.1323 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0345) (0.0304) (0.0303) 
[0.0061] [0.0026] [0.0024] 
4 0.0068 ∗ ∗ 0.0061 ∗ ∗ 0.0017 ∗ ∗ 0.0017 ∗ ∗ 0.0010 1.3593 ∗ ∗ 1.1390 ∗ ∗ 1.1261 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0371) (0.0326) (0.0324) 
[0.0060] [0.0026] [0.0023] 
5 0.0071 ∗ ∗ 0.0065 ∗ ∗ 0.0020 ∗ ∗ 0.0021 ∗ ∗ 0.0012 1.3873 ∗ ∗ 1.1625 ∗ ∗ 1.1548 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0411) (0.0359) (0.0359) 
[0.0064] [0.0030] [0.0028] 
Estimation model 
Covariates included 
(in addition to 
dummies for crime in 
comparison group in 
relative years) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE Logit Logit Logit 








































Mean of dependent 
variable in 
comparison group 
0.0196 0.0196 0.0196 0.0196 0.0196 0.0196 0.0196 0.0196 
R-squared 0.0006 0.0104 0.0104 0.0146 0.1696 
N 10,526,937 10,526,937 10,526,937 10,526,937 10,526,937 10,526,937 10,526,937 10,526,937 
Note: Estimates of how much higher the likelihood of crime is among the displaced than the comparison group (and the pre-displacement period of the displaced for 
Models 3–5 and 7–8) in the given relative year (0 indicates the baseline year). Odds-ratios reported for the logit estimations with implied mean marginal effects in 
square brackets, and marginal effects reported for OLS regressions. ∗ and ∗ ∗ denote significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses 









probability of being included in the sample, where n represents the number of hould not bias the point estimates, it raises concerns that the estimated
tandard errors are too small (but recall that this concern is limited by
he fact that we always cluster on the individual level). In Model 2 of
able 3 we have randomly selected no more than one baseline year
or each worker in the comparison group. 23 As expected, this produces23 To create a sample representative of our original comparison group sam- 






imilar point estimates as in our reference model, but the sample size
rops substantially and the estimated standard errors become bigger.imes the worker was included in the original comparison group sample. (Recall, 
orkers in the comparison group could be included for up to 10 baseline years). 
ext, for included workers, one of their records was randomly chosen for inclu- 
ion. If we had omitted the first step, the restricted comparison group sample 
ould have been over-represented by workers with less consistent employment. 
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Table 3 
Robustness checks of the effect on crime of being displaced in relative year 0 (baseline year). 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Dependent variable: Any crime in the given relative year 
Estimate of effect of 
displacement in given 
relative year 
− 1 1.1085 ∗ ∗ 1.1052 ∗ ∗ 1.0735 1.0784 ∗ ∗ 1.1317 ∗ ∗ 1.1282 ∗ ∗ 1.0959 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0264) (0.0377) (0.0368) (0.0254) (0.0497) (0.0373) (0.0268) 
[0.0020] [0.0022] [0.0014] [0.0016] [0.0019] [0.0021] [0.0018] 
0 1.1987 ∗ ∗ 1.2011 ∗ ∗ 1.1785 ∗ ∗ 1.1336 ∗ ∗ 1.1124 ∗ 1.1993 ∗ ∗ 1.1930 ∗ ∗ 1.1628 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0286) (0.0412) (0.0400) (0.0266) (0.0503) (0.0400) (0.0294) (0.0307) 
[0.0035] [0.0041] [0.0031] [0.0026] [0.0016] [0.0032] [0.0034] [0.0027] 
1 1.1912 ∗ ∗ 1.1879 ∗ ∗ 1.1441 ∗ ∗ 1.1380 ∗ ∗ 1.2257 ∗ ∗ 1.1893 ∗ ∗ 1.1927 ∗ ∗ 1.1766 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0293) (0.0414) (0.0402) (0.0275) (0.0546) (0.0411) (0.0303) (0.0317) 
[0.0034] [0.0038] [0.0026] [0.0027] [0.0031] [0.0031] [0.0034] [0.0029] 
2 1.1537 ∗ ∗ 1.1788 ∗ ∗ 1.1088 ∗ ∗ 1.1042 ∗ ∗ 1.2058 ∗ ∗ 1.1464 ∗ ∗ 1.1466 ∗ ∗ 1.1480 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0292) (0.0423) (0.0400) (0.0275) (0.545) (0.0407) (0.0300) (0.0316) 
[0.0028] [0.0037] [0.0020] [0.0021] [0.0028] [0.0024] [0.0026] [0.0025] 
Displaced (dummy) 1.1713 ∗ ∗ 1.1575 ∗ ∗ 1.1313 ∗ ∗ 1.1240 ∗ ∗ 1.1568 ∗ ∗ 1.1861 ∗ ∗ 1.1916 ∗ ∗ 1.1399 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0160) (0.0203) (0.0211) (0.0149) (0.0282) (0.0226) (0.0170) (0.0161) 
[0.0031] [0.0033] [0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0022] [0.0030] [0.0034] [0.0023] 
Sample redefinitions Reference 
model (i.e. 
Model 8, 
Table 2 ) 
Comparison 




ensures that an 
individual is 
never present 
in more than 
one base-line 
year (see 
Section 5.2 . for 
details) 
Displaced if 
PDR > 0.9 
(instead 
of PDR > 0.3) 
Workers in 
comparison 
group remain in 
plant through 
− 1 (instead of 
through 
baseline year) 
Tenure ≥ 5 
(instead 
of tenure ≥ 2) 
Plant size ≥ 50 
(instead of 
plant 
size ≥ 10) 
Comparison 
group 
if PDR ≤ 0.1 (in- 
stead of 








Mean of dependent 
variable in 
comparison group 
0.0196 0.0198 0.0196 0.0212 0.0152 0.0179 0.0191 0.0180 
N 10,526,937 1,842,131 10,093,950 12,931,965 5,600,492 6,147,571 7,384,630 9,321,536 
Note: Estimates of the effect of displacement (in the baseline year, denoted 0) on crime (dummy) in the given relative year. Estimated using logit models (odds-ratios 
reported, with implied mean marginal effects in square brackets). All covariates described in Appx. B included in all models (coefficients for them and for effect 
estimates in years 3–5 not reported). ∗ and ∗ ∗ denote significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses corrected for non-independent 











































24 As noted in Section 3 , previous studies have typically required that the work- 
ers in the comparison group remain in their plant of employment throughout 
the observation window (for us that could be through + 5). The advantage of this 
requirement is that effect estimates are not attenuated by the presence in the 
comparison group of workers who are laid off in association with downsizing 
events after the baseline year ( “partly treated ”). The possible disadvantage is 
that the comparison group then comprises very stable workers who may exhibit 
different trends in criminal behavior (e.g. steeper declines over time), which 
might result in upward-biased effect estimates. he point estimates, however, remain significant at the one percent
evel. 
Another concern is that less productive workers might be the first to
e laid off in association with mass-layoffs. To the extent that laid off
orkers commit more crime irrespective of displacement, this would
ot bias our effect estimate of the overall effect of job displacement on
rime (since we contrast crime rates after displacement with rates of the
ame men before displacement). Bias could arise, however, if the crimi-
al behavior of such workers was more responsive to displacement. We
an get an idea of this possible bias by restricting the sample to workers
eparated from plants that closed, since closing plants are not retaining
mployees and thus have no discretion with respect to whom to lay-
ff. In Model 3 of Table 3 we restrict the definition of the displaced to
orkers separated from a plant that downsized by more than 90 percent
and the comparison group remains the same as before). As we can see,
his reduces the point estimates somewhat, suggesting some differen-
ial selection of more crime-prone workers in our main displaced worker
ample. Nonetheless, the estimates remain large and highly significant.
In Model 4 we remove the requirement that the workers in the com-
arison group remain in the plant throughout the baseline year. This
equirement could generate selection of less crime-prone workers (on
nobservables) into the comparison group. Removing this requirement
lso implies, however, that the comparison group can now include work-
rs who are separated from a plant in association with a smaller down-
izing (e.g. with mass layoffs of 29 percent). One may argue that this
esults in some partly treated (i.e. separated in association with 29 per-ent downsizing) workers ending up in the comparison group, thereby
ttenuating the effect estimate. 24 In line with what we would expect
rom the attenuation story, we see from Model 4 that the effect esti-
ate of the baseline year declines somewhat under this restriction, but
t remains significant. 
In Models 5 and 6 we check for robustness to the sample selection
riteria related to increasing the requirements for tenure and plant size.
he effect estimate for the baseline year is somewhat lower when we
equire tenure of at least 5 years (instead of 2 years), but the effect esti-
ates are larger in years 1 and 2 (see Model 5). Restricting to plants with
t least 50 employees (instead of 10) produces effect estimates (Model 6)
hat are almost identical to the estimate of our reference model. Finally,
e check that the results are not sensitive to the downsizing requirement
f the comparison group. In the main specification we required that the
lant of employment did not downsize 30 percent or more around the
aseline year, while in Model 7 we have changed this requirement to
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Table 4 
Effects on labor market attachment of being displaced in relative year 0 (baseline year). 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 















− 1 1.1085 ∗ ∗ 64.97 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0264) (5.21) 
[0.0020] 
0 1.1987 ∗ ∗ 0.0141 ∗ ∗ 7.5097 ∗ ∗ − 39.37 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0286) (0.0003) (0.1478) (6.47) 
[0.0035] [ − 0.3276] [0.0872] 
1 1.1912 ∗ ∗ 0.2948 ∗ ∗ 4.8932 ∗ ∗ − 190.51 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0293) (0.0036) (0.0903) (6.61) 
[0.0034] [ − 0.0940] [0.0687] 
2 1.1537 ∗ ∗ 0.4745 ∗ ∗ 2.8280 ∗ ∗ − 127.45 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0292) (0.0058) (0.0554) (7.52) 
[0.0028] [ − 0.0573] [0.0450] 
Displaced 
(dummy) 
1.1713 ∗ ∗ 0.8632 ∗ ∗ 1.1469 ∗ ∗ − 22.65 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0160) (0.0067) (0.0119) (3.25) 
[0.0031] [ − 0.0113] [0.0059] 
Estimation model Logit Logit Logit OLS 
Mean of dependent variable in comparison group 0.0196 0.910 0.0480 3070 
R-squared 0.5623 
N 10,526,937 9,506,997 7,760,990 10,526,937 
Note: Estimates of the effect of displacement (in the baseline year, denoted 0) on the given labor market attachment variables 
in the given relative year. Odds-ratios reported for logit models (with implied mean marginal effects in square brackets) 
and marginal effects for the OLS model. All observed covariates described in Appx. B included in all models (but estimates 
are not reported). Fewer observations are utilized in (logit) models 2 and 3 because there is no variation in the dependent 
variable for some categories (for example, we have required all workers to be full time employed in − 1). ∗ and ∗ ∗ denote 
significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses corrected for non-independent observations 



































































25 We have also run the regressions on the crime categories in Table 5 on sam- 
ples excluding any worker charged in relative year − 1 or 0, and the same pattern 
occurs: There is some decline in effect estimates, but the main results remain. 0 percent. We see that this hardly affects the estimates. Overall, our
ain results appear reasonably robust across variations in data defini-
ions and model specifications. 
A particular concern arises in our context due to the potential for
everse causality. Our identification strategy assumes the difference in
rime propensities across the displaced and comparison groups are fixed
ver time. However, being charged with a crime could increase one’s
ikelihood of being let go during a downsizing. At a minimum, this would
ead to upwards biased estimates for the displacement effect in relative
ear − 1. However, as we have noted, there are reasons to expect dis-
lacement crime effects to emerge prior to a worker’s recorded displace-
ent date, due to the advanced notice workers receive before a layoff
nd the incorrect (late) recording of some job separations. Nonetheless,
he sizable estimates in relative year − 1 might also partly reflect reverse
ausation, which we cannot rule out. And if criminal behavior in rela-
ive year − 1 indicates a higher propensity for criminal behavior going
orward (independent of displacement), the crime effects we estimate
or subsequent years would then be upwards biased as well. 
To investigate whether reverse causation substantially biases esti-
ates pertaining to subsequent years, Model 8 estimates our main spec-
fication excluding from the sample all workers who were criminally
harged in relative year − 1. This is far from an ideal test. While we
liminate any workers for whom reverse causality is potentially rele-
ant, we also eliminate workers who exhibited a true response to an
mpending (or mistimed) layoff. Eliminating these true responders, we
ould anticipate smaller effects estimated over the remaining sample
f displaced workers. In light of that, the fact that estimates in Model
 are only modestly smaller is reassuring. The odds-ratio estimate for
elative year 0 is 18 percent smaller under this sample restriction,
ith even smaller differences (of 8 and 4 percent) in relative years 1
nd 2. 
The workers who were charged in relative year 0 may to an even
arger extent than those charged in relative year − 1, be responding to
n impending or actual displacement, and thus when we exclude them
rom the sample the effect estimates (not reported) decline somewhat
ore (12 and 19 percent, instead of 8 and 4 percent). However, thehange is within one standard error, and the main results remain similar
nd statistically significant. 25 
. Mechanisms 
In this section, we investigate the plausibility of alternative channels
hat might explain the estimated effects of job displacement on crime.
e do so by estimating effects across crime categories ( Section 6.1 ) and
ays of the week ( Section 6.2 ). 
As the labor market effects of displacement are key factors in the
arnings replacement and time availability mechanisms, we first present
vidence of them in Table 4 . Model 1 replicates the crime effect esti-
ates from our preferred specification. Model 2 demonstrates a sub-
tantial reduction (33 percentage points, cf. the implied mean marginal
ffects in square brackets) in the likelihood of being fulltime employed at
he end of the baseline year, though fulltime employment rates recover
s one would expect in subsequent years (6 percentage points reduc-
ion at the end of year 2). Similarly, Model 3 estimates a steep increase
n the likelihood of drawing unemployment benefits, that also peaks
n the baseline year and fades over time. The results for both full-time
mployment and unemployment therefore suggest an increase in time
vailability for displaced workers which peaks in the year of displace-
ent, before declining in years 1 and 2. Model 4 demonstrates an earn-
ngs effect that is more delayed, peaking in year 1 and still larger in year
 than in the baseline year. Interestingly, earnings for displaced workers
n the year before displacement are significantly larger than predicted
ased on their earlier pre-displacement earnings, a result we cannot ex-
lain (see similar findings in Couch and Plazek, 2010 and Basten et al.,
016 ). Nonetheless, the results provide support that the earnings replace-
ent and time availability mechanisms are both plausibly at work. 
We would caution the reader against two unwarranted hypothe-
es these findings could inspire. First, even if the earnings replacement
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Table 5 
Effects by crime category of being displaced in relative year 0 (baseline year). 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 















− 1 1.1085 ∗ ∗ 1.0467 1.2246 ∗ ∗ 1.1850 ∗ ∗ 1.5165 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0264) (0.0374) (0.0848) (0.0573) (0.1389) 
[0.0020] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0007] [0.0005] 
0 1.1987 ∗ ∗ 1.1730 ∗ ∗ 1.1990 ∗ 1.3379 ∗ ∗ 1.6339 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0286) (0.0411) (0.0864) (0.0645) (0.1483) 
[0.0035] [0.0015] [0.0004] [0.0012] [0.0005] 
1 1.1912 ∗ ∗ 1.1783 ∗ ∗ 1.1204 1.2994 ∗ ∗ 1.3580 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0293) (0.0424) (0.0844) (0.0645) (0.1267) 
[0.0034] [0.0016] [0.0003] [0.0011] [0.0003] 
2 1.1537 ∗ ∗ 1.1564 ∗ ∗ 1.0224 1.2254 ∗ ∗ 1.3480 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0292) (0.0424) (0.0825) (0.0643) (0.1269) 
[0.0028] [0.0014] [0.0000] [0.0009] [0.0003] 
Displaced 
(dummy) 
1.1713 ∗ ∗ 1.1649 ∗ ∗ 1.1611 ∗ ∗ 1.1929 ∗ ∗ 1.4327 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0160) (0.0212) (0.0457) (0.0339) (0.0675) 
[0.0031] [0.0014] [0.0003] [0.0007] [0.0004] 
Mean of dependent variable in comparison group 0.0196 0.0093 0.0022 0.0041 0.0010 
N 10,526,937 10,526,937 10,526,937 10,526,937 10,526,937 
Note: Estimates of the effect of displacement (in the baseline year, denoted 0) on the given category of crime (dummy) in the given 
relative year. Estimated using logit models (odds-ratios reported, with implied mean marginal effects in square brackets). All covariates 
described in Appx. B included in all models (but estimates are not reported). ∗ and ∗ ∗ denote significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels. 








































































echanism is operating (e.g. peaking in year 1), we should not neces-
arily expect the crime effects to follow the same time pattern. Ratio-
al actor theories would indicate the utility of illicit earnings increases
he moment expectations about future income change, not when the lost
arnings are realized. Second, even if the time availability mechanism is
perating, we should not necessarily expect crime effects to decline at
 similar trajectory. If those workers most prone to criminal behavior
n response to a displacement are also those most likely to remain out
f the workforce, high crime effects could persist even as employment
ates begin to recover. 
We unfortunately have no direct evidence regarding the mental dis-
ress that displaced workers experienced (if any), nor any direct evi-
ence pertaining to diminished self-control – factors highlighted by the
general theory of crime ” discussed earlier. Nonetheless, we believe the
vidence below sheds some light on the importance of these mechanisms
s potential contributors to the crime effects we estimate. 
.1. Category of crime 
We now estimate the effect of plant closure on crimes of different
ategories. If the effect of job displacement on crime is largely driven
y incentives to replace lost employment earnings with illicit earn-
ngs (the earnings replacement mechanism), we particularly expect to see
n increase in crimes for profit, which fall in the category of property
rimes . 26 On the other hand, if the time availability mechanism or mental
istress/self-control mechanism are at work, we would expect to see a
ise in other categories of crime as well. 
In Table 5 we report estimates of the effect of displacement on the
ikelihood that the workers are charged with each of the four aggregate
ategories violent crimes, property crimes, crimes related to alcohol and
rugs, and serious traffic violations (see Appendix A for details). We will
ocus on the relative effects (odds ratios), but since the underlying crime
ate differs considerably across crime categories, we also report the im-
lied marginal effects (in square brackets). Displaced workers have a sig-
ificantly higher probability of being charged with all of the four crime
ategories. The estimated relative effect on violent crimes and crimes re-
ated to traffic, are roughly the same magnitude (Models 2 and 3) in the26 Not all property crimes, however, can be regarded as crimes for profit (e.g. 
ost cases of vandalism and some cases of arson are solely destructive in nature). 
a
s
aseline year. However, in the case of violent crimes, the effect is large
n relative years − 1 and 0, before diminishing. In contrast, the effect on
raffic crimes emerges in the baseline year and remains high through
elative year 2. To some degree, the durability of the traffic violation
ffect might be related to re-employment in jobs requiring a longer com-
ute ( Evans and Graham, 1988 ). We find somewhat stronger relative
ffects for crimes related to alcohol and drugs (Model 4), which peak
n the baseline year before diminishing somewhat in successive years.
his observation aligns with Eliason and Storrie (2009) who find that
isplacement raises hospitalizations due to alcohol-related conditions.
he biggest relative effects, however, are on property crimes, with esti-
ates that peak in the baseline year before declining somewhat. In the
aseline year, the effect estimate suggests that job displacement raises
he likelihood of property crimes by about 60 percent (Model 5). The
arge effect on property crime suggests an important role for the earnings
echanism. However, the finding of sizable effects for non-acquisitive
rimes would suggest other mechanisms are also at work. 
The time patterns of these estimates also speak to potential mecha-
isms. Group-level differences in employment open in the year of dis-
lacement before closing somewhat over the years that follow ( Fig. 1 ).
f the crime effects were strictly a result of time availability , we would
xpect crime effects to moderate in relative years 1 and 2, as they gen-
rally appear to do. However, we would also anticipate only a small
stimated effect in relative year − 1, as an artifact of any mistimed sep-
rations in our data (discussed in Section 3 ). Instead, aside from traffic
iolations, the 𝛿− 1 estimates are sizable and significant, even exceeding
he estimate of 𝛿0 for violent offenses. This would seem to indicate that
nowledge of an impending layoff plays a meaningful role in contempo-
aneous criminal behavior. Rational actor theories could explain such
 result for property crimes – a forward-looking worker perceives in-
reased utility from illicit earnings once that worker recognizes future
mployment earnings are imperiled. But they cannot explain the large
ffects for violent and alcohol/drug offenses. Combined with the nature
f these offenses, this would seem to suggest an important role for the
ental distress/self-control mechanism in explaining these findings. 27 27 An alternative possibility is that the positive estimates of 𝛿− 1 are biased as 
 consequence of reverse causality. If the initiation of criminal activity causes 
ome workers to be selectively displaced, we would expect a displacement “ef- 
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Fig. 3. Effect of displacement on crime (in baseline year) by day 
of week. 
Fig. 4. Effect of displacement on crime (in base- 





















r  .2. Crime by day of week 
We now estimate the effect of job displacement on crimes committed
n different days of the week. If displacement reduces the opportunity
ost of spending time in illicit activities ( time availability mechanism),
e expect crime effects to be more pronounced on work days (when
ost paid work occurs) than on weekends. 
In Fig. 3 we report odds-ratios (with 95 percent confidence intervals)
f the relative effect of displacement on crime in the baseline year onect ” to emerge prior to the displacement event, with estimates in subsequent 
eriods likely biased upwards as well. We are unable to fully rule this out this 
ossibility, though the result in Table 3 (see Models 3 and 8, cf. discussion at 





he given day of the week, applying our reference model without 28 the
arge set of control variables (i.e. the approach of Model 7, Table 2 ) for
ach day individually. Fig. 3 also includes results from models where
ork days are grouped together, and where Saturdays and Sundays are
rouped together. As we see, the estimated positive effect of displace-
ent on crime holds both for crimes committed on work days and on
eekends. However, the magnitude is larger on work days, which sug-
ests that increased time availability (or the upheaval of structured daily
outines) contributes to the overall effect of job displacement on crime.
We replicate this analysis by individual categories of crime in Fig. 4 ,
nd the results indicate that day-of-week effects differ across crime28 We were unable to have some of these models converge when including the 
ull set of covariates (i.e. the approach taken in Model 8 of Table 2 ). For the 
odels that did converge, the results were very similar to those reported here. 




























































































































29 Aggregate charged data for only men aged 18-40 is not available at Statistics 
Norway (2019) . Of the overall 83,600 persons charged, more than 15 percent 
were women. Assuming a similar rate of women at age 18-40, would imply 
about 42,000 young adult men charged, of which 800 crimes comprise about 2 ategories. For property crimes, the increase is similar on work days
nd weekends, suggesting little role for the time availability mechanism
n the property crime effect. Instead, it appears that the reduction in
arnings associated with job displacement – rather than the increased
vailability of time – induces the displaced workers to engage in prop-
rty crime. 
However, for crimes related to alcohol and drugs and for traffic viola-
ions, the displacement effect is driven by an increase in crimes commit-
ed during the work days. For crimes related to traffic, idleness could re-
ult in more driving during the work days, with corresponding exposure
o being charged with traffic violations. Or it might be that the displaced
orkers take new jobs where they drive more or that are further away
rom home (with longer commute, cf. Evans and Graham, 1988 ), which
lso make them more exposed to being charged with traffic violations. 
Less structured daily routines during work days could result in more
onsumption of alcohol and drugs. This is in line with a literature that
inks job displacement and involvement in crime to consumption of
lcohol and drugs ( Eliason and Storie, 2009 ; Schroeder et al., 2007 ;
rawford et al., 2006 ; Dawkins, 1997 ). Increased consumption of al-
ohol and drugs might also reflect mental distress (e.g. Dragano et al.,
005, Vahtera and Kivimaki, 1997 ). However, if the effect of displace-
ent on alcohol/drug-related crimes was solely related to mental dis-
ress, we might expect that the effect would have been similar in magni-
ude on work days and weekends. Our results therefore indicate that dis-
lacement affects alcohol/drug crimes by increasing individual propen-
ities for illegal alcohol/drug use, perhaps as a consequence of mental
istress, but that the expression of this increased propensity is amplified
y less structured daily routines on work days. 
The estimated day-of-week effects of displacement on violent crimes
re imprecise and somewhat more erratic than for other crime cate-
ories. Overall, there is little difference in the violent crime effect across
ork days and weekends, with only a slightly larger effect on workdays.
hus, time availability seems to play a minor role in explaining the vi-
lent crime effects of displacement, though we would add an important
aveat to that. Card and Dahl (2011) demonstrate the importance of
victim availability ” in the occurrence of violent behavior. Violent crime
equires victims , who are perhaps more available on weekends than on
ork days, which could temper any differential work day effects due to
ime availability. 
. Conclusion 
We have estimated the impact of job displacement on crime using
 panel data set comprising Norwegian men below the age of 40. Our
esults suggest that being separated from the job in association with a
ass layoff increases the likelihood of being charged of a crime by about
0 percent in the year of displacement, with ongoing effects that weaken
ver time. 
To put the magnitude of this effect into perspective, we can con-
uct a back-of-the-envelope calculation for the extent job displacements
ight contribute to aggregate crime levels in Norway. Gorda (2016) pro-
ides evidence that the annual rate of worker transitions from employ-
ent to non-employment was approximately 5.5 percent in Norway
ver the 2005–12 period. She also finds that the annual rate of workers
ith twelve months in employment during two consecutive years who
hanged employer since last year, was 16 percent. While most of these
ob-to-job transitions are likely to be voluntary, some of the workers
ay, like in our sample, have been displaced and even experienced up
o 12 months of non-employment. Thus, the rate of workers experienc-
ng a form of displacement in a year – for which our crime estimates
ay be relevant - is likely to exceed 5 percent and be well below 20
ercent (see also Schmieder et al., 2018 or Aurdal and Næsheim, 2015 ).
In 2010, the Norwegian workforce comprised about 2 million work-
rs, of which roughly 500 000 were males under 40 years of age. If
e assume an annual displacement rate of 10 percent for the 500,000
oung male adults, this implies 50,000 annual displacements in this
p
opulation. Applying the linear effect estimates pertaining to years 0
hrough 5 following displacement (in Table 2 , Model 4), we would ex-
ect 800 additional individuals to be charged annually as a result of
ecently experienced displacements. This represents about one percent
f the 84,000 persons criminally charged in Norway in 2010, and closer
o 2 percent of the 50,000 men and women aged 18–40 charged in the
ear ( Statistics Norway 2019 ). 29 Thus, while we find substantial effects
f job displacement on crime, the importance of job displacement for
ggregate crime levels seems moderate, maybe except in situations of
xtreme youth unemployment shocks with scaring effects ( Bell et al.,
018 ; Fishback et al., 2010 ). 
Bell et al. (2018) find that people who leave school during recessions
re significantly more likely to lead a life of crime than those entering
 buoyant labor market. If displacement for young males could have
imilar life-determining effects on crime as graduation in a recessions,
he overall effect on national crime rates could of course be higher. Our
ndings may contribute to our understanding of how to shield displaced
orkers from entering crime, with possible long-term scaring effects. 
In line with the predictions of traditional rational crime theory, as
ell as the existing literature analyzing the effect of area unemploy-
ent on crime rates, we find evidence that job loss especially increases
he likelihood of property crime. We document the negative effect of
isplacement on labor market outcomes – in the form of lower future
mployment and earnings – which further supports the idea that dis-
laced workers turn to illicit earnings opportunities in response to job
oss. The finding that property crimes do not increase more on work
ays than on weekends, and the fact that this effect starts to emerge
n the year preceding displacement, seems to indicate that it is the re-
uction in earnings (or the anticipation thereof) that induces property
rime, rather than reductions in the opportunity cost of time. 
However, unlike area-level studies (where results have been mixed),
e also find compelling evidence that job displacement raises the rate
f violent crimes, as well as crime rates for lower-level offenses (alco-
ol/drug offenses, serious traffic violations) that have received less at-
ention in the literature. These findings imply that forces other than
he earnings replacement mechanism are operating on the criminal be-
avior of displaced workers. Effects on non-property crimes are more
ronounced on work days than on weekends, which suggest a role for
ime availability and the loss of structured daily routines. 
Yet the time availability mechanism appears insufficient to explain
ther aspects of our findings. If this were the only mechanism, we would
ot expect an increase in non-property crime until after the displacement
ctually occurred. However, for both violent crime and alcohol/drug of-
enses, we find evidence of substantial increases in the year preceding
isplacement. As we have discussed, this suggests that impending job
oss affects the workers, which, along with the nature of these crimes,
ppear most consistent with the mental distress/self-control mechanism.
e have no way to directly test whether such a mechanism was op-
rational in our sample of workers, though it seems likely given other
ublished evidence (e.g. Dragano et al., 2005, Vahtera and Kivimaki,
997 ). 
Our findings in support of the time availability and mental distress/self-
ontrol mechanisms suggest policies targeting these mechanisms could
e effective at inhibiting the crime response to displacement. For in-
tance, policies that were successful at helping displaced young males
emain engaged in structured daily activities could help reduce crimes
rising as a consequence of idleness. However, we would anticipate that
he most successful interventions for reducing the crime response of dis-
laced male workers would arise from trying to address all three mech-ercent. 



































































































R  nisms simultaneously – as might be achieved through a well-executed
etraining (return-to-work) program. 
Our findings do highlight a specific target for policy interven-
ion on the basis of the relatively large effects of displacement on
rug/alcohol crimes. Given this finding, programs designed to discour-
ge alcohol/drug abuse targeted to displaced young men, could yield
izable welfare improvements for the men, while also reducing crimes
temming from that abuse, which includes violence. 30 
As a concluding remark, we would remind the reader that these re-
ults pertain to a specific context (Norway), where employment rates
nd income levels are relatively high, rates of serious crime and in-
arceration are relatively low, and a generous social safety net exists
hich reduces the material hardship resulting from displacement. In
ountries where the financial implications of job loss are more severe,
uch as the US, we might anticipate a larger crime response operat-
ng through both the earnings replacement and mental distress/self-control
echanisms. Similarly, the extent that crime effects operate through the
ime availability mechanism presumably depends on the duration of non-
mployment suffered by the displaced. In conditions when displaced
orkers find it difficult to quickly regain employment, like during re-
essions, we should anticipate a larger crime response when workers are
isplaced. 
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